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UKRAINE: ANALYZING THE REVOLUTION AND NATO 
ACTION IN LIGHT OF THE U.N. CHARTER AND NICARAGUA 
ABSTRACT 
Ukraine has been in a precarious position since its independence in 1991. 
It has been in the midst of an identity crisis. The eastern part of the country is 
partial to Russia, while the western half of the country prefers to be politically 
aligned with Europe. Since 2014, Ukraine has been wrought with a political 
coup, civil unrest in the Donbass region, and subject to Russian aggression. 
The current Ukrainian government established in wake of the coup is 
attempting to quell the uprisings from dissenters and Russian forces in the 
eastern part of the country, and NATO has diplomatically supported the 
current Ukrainian government. However, Ukraine is not a member of NATO, 
thus the country cannot avail itself of collective defense as set out in Article 5 
of the NATO Treaty. This Comment argues that any assistance from NATO 
countries to the current Ukrainian government would violate the International 
Court of Justice’s decision in Nicaragua v. United States because the current 
government is illegitimate.  
INTRODUCTION 
Ukraine is in the midst of a tug of war and has been since 1991. European 
influence pulls the country in one direction, while Russian influence pulls it in 
the opposite direction. Throughout 2014, Ukraine was divided by political 
revolution and was placed under political and military pressure by Russia. 
Russia has annexed the Crimean peninsula and there is some evidence that it 
has fomented rebellion in eastern Ukraine.1 These events have resulted in the 
highest tensions between Russia and the West since the height of the Cold 
War. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), one of the most 
formidable collective defense organizations in the world, has held special 
sessions addressing Ukraine, fearful of Russia’s advancing and escalating 
aggression toward NATO members, and the United States has decided to place 
embargos on Russia.2 
 
 1 See infra Part II.  
 2 See, e.g., Doug Schoen, New U.S. Sanctions on Russia Go Further Than Ever Before, FORBES (July 17, 
2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougschoen/2014/07/17/new-us-sanctions-against-russia-go-further-than-ever-
EMERY GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/24/2016 11:25 AM 
434 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
Furthermore, the United States and other NATO members have supplied 
Ukraine with weapons in an effort to thwart Russia’s advances.3 Article 5 of 
the North Atlantic Treaty permits NATO to engage in collective military 
defense on behalf of its members, but since Ukraine is not a member, NATO 
may not intervene militarily on behalf of the country.4 Ukraine is already 
internally divided as a result of former President Viktor Yanukovych’s ouster 
and the subsequent establishment of a new governmental regime.5 
Additionally, Russia’s incursions and annexation of Ukrainian territory marked 
the first time since World War II that a country has invaded sovereign territory 
in Eastern Europe.6 NATO allies are fearful that Russian aggression will 
ultimately divide the Ukrainian state, resulting in a revival of Cold War 
tensions. NATO is hesitant to sit on its hands as Russia encroaches on its 
members, and it will look to support Ukraine as best it can. The world is 
watching NATO and Russia, as it is the next great geopolitical chess game to 
invoke the legal limits of a collective defense organization’s resort to force. 
This is the situational crisis the West never hoped to see. 
Prior to examining the legal ramifications of this crisis, it is imperative to 
set the historical and political stage. To approach the current Ukrainian crisis, 
Ukraine-Russian relations, and the interplay of NATO action, Part I of this 
Comment begins with a historical analysis of Ukraine and its connection to 
Russia. In order to fully understand where we are and where we are going, we 
must understand how we got here. While that expression is somewhat cliché, it 
exhibits unwavering truth. Part II of this Comment provides a brief historical 
analysis that will elucidate why Russians feel so strongly about Ukraine and 
portrays how the events that unfolded over the past several years are symptoms 
of deeper historical tensions between the two countries. After examining 
Ukraine’s historical inception, this Comment analyzes the events that unfolded 
in Ukraine over the final months of 2013 and all of 2014. 
Part III of this Comment examines what NATO countries may do to defend 
a non-NATO country, especially when its fall is of crucial consequence to 
 
before/; see also NATO Summit to Highlight Unity Against Russia, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www. 
aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/09/nato-summit-highlight-unity-against-russia-20149445948732370.html.  
 3 NATO Members ‘start arms deliveries to Ukraine,’ BBC NEWS (Sept. 14, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/ 
news/world-europe-29198497.  
 4 North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. 
 5 See infra Part II.A. 
 6 Will Englund, Kremlin Says Crimea Is Now Officially Part of Russia After Treaty Signing, Putin 
Speech, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russias-putin-prepares-to-annex-
crimea/2014/03/18/933183b2-654e-45ce-920e-4d18c0ffec73_story.html. 
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nearby NATO countries. In other words, how much may NATO intervene on 
behalf of a non-NATO country? Part IV of this Comment examines the various 
legal issues involved in this crisis. It first examines the justifications for the use 
of force and then analyzes NATO’s actions and purported justifications with 
respect to the use of force in Kosovo in 1999. It then examines whether the 
new Ukrainian government, established in the wake of the 2014 revolution, is 
legitimate. 
The question of legitimacy has profound implications for whether NATO 
countries may provide the current Ukrainian government with weapons to 
secure its power and legitimacy over the eastern part of the country.7 If the 
government is not legitimate, then the United States and other NATO 
countries, in the contribution of arms and training of soldiers to and for the 
current Ukrainian government, would be in violation of the International Court 
of Justice’s (ICJ) decision in Nicaragua v. United States.8 Part V of this 
Comment examines whether eastern Ukraine is being denied the right of self-
determination and can thus engage in external self-determination to unite with 
Russia, a country with which it has closer ethnic, cultural, and political ties. 
As a general proposition, Nicaragua stipulates that it is illegal for a state to 
intervene on behalf of a rebel group for the purpose of overthrowing a 
legitimate state government unless it is a war of national liberation.9 A war of 
national liberation is generally seen as legitimate because it is closely 
connected to the right of self-determination.10 In terms of Ukraine, the issue is 
whether the United States and other NATO countries may be violating 
Nicaragua by intervening on behalf of a government that is not legitimate. The 
current Ukrainian government is not what one would usually think of as rebels, 
but it was placed into power as a result of a revolution. Western Ukrainians 
vehemently rebelled against the prior government’s political decisions, and the 
protests quickly developed into revolution and ouster of the President.11 There 
was an immediate change of power with little regard for due process, and there 
 
 7 See generally Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).  
 8 See id. ¶¶ 239–45 (explaining that the United States intended to overthrow the government of 
Nicaragua by way of supporting and assisting rebels whose purpose was to overthrow its government, which 
amounts to an intervention that constitutes a clear breach of the principle of non-intervention firmly rooted in 
international law).  
 9 See id.; see also PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 
336 (Routledge, 7th ed. 1997).  
 10 Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. ¶¶ 239–45.  
 11 See infra Part II.A. 
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was little justification for a revolution of such scale.12 The current government 
is trying to take control over the entirety of the country, mainly through 
suppressing dissenters in eastern Ukraine.13 Although the current government 
is already in power and NATO did not assist in overthrowing the prior regime, 
NATO is attempting to help assert and establish the current government’s 
legitimacy. In short, the West wants this current government in power for 
political reasons and weapons are being given to suppress the protesters in 
eastern Ukraine. 
I. HISTORICAL, CULTURAL, AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF UKRAINE 
A. Historical Development of Ukraine 
The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet declared Ukraine to be independent from 
the Soviet Union on August 24, 1991, by a vote of 346 to one.14 The 
Declaration of Independence of Ukraine was put to a referendum a few months 
later and received overwhelming support.15 Later that same month, the Soviet 
Union officially dissolved, and Ukraine became an independent state.16 
Previously, Ukraine had asserted independence during the Ukrainian 
Revolution in 1917,17 but that was short-lived because the country was 
overtaken by the Soviet Union in 1920.18 
The Treaty of Riga, formalized in March 1921, officially established the 
Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (“Uk SSR”),19 but also conceded much of 
current day western Ukraine (western Volhynia) to Poland.20 During World 
War II, Soviet forces invaded Poland and annexed western Ukraine in an 
attempt to reunify the Soviet satellite country.21 After World War II, the Soviet 
 
 12 See infra Part IV.D. 
 13 See infra Part II.D.  
 14 PAUL KUBICEK, THE HISTORY OF UKRAINE 136 (2008). 
 15 SERHY YEKELCHYK, UKRAINE: BIRTH OF A MODERN NATION 191 (2007). The Declaration was put to a 
referendum on December 1, 1991, and of the 84.2% that voted, 90.3% voted in favor of independence. Id. 
 16 KUBICEK, supra note 14, at 138. 
 17 YEKELCHYK, supra note 15, at 67–68 (explaining that the collapse of the Russian and Austro-
Hungarian empires and the political events culminating after World War I created an opportunity for Ukrainian 
Nationalists to establish Ukraine as a nation).  
 18 KUBICEK, supra note 14, at 90 (explaining that the Bolsheviks, in conjunction with Russian support, 
took over much of Ukraine and established Russian rule); see also YEKELCHYK, supra note 14, at 83 
(explaining the collapse of the short lived independent Ukraine in 1920). 
 19 KUBICEK, supra note 14, at 98. 
 20 YEKELCHYK, supra note 15, at 83. 
 21 KUBICEK, supra note 14, at 107. 
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Union seized more land from Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia, and 
annexed it to the Uk SSR.22 From the independence movement that unfolded in 
1991, it is evident the idea of an independent Ukraine was never extinct, but 
only dormant. 
B. Cultural Underpinnings of Ukraine 
Russia has always had an interest in and felt a strong connection to 
Ukraine. Russian tsars viewed Ukraine as subordinate to Russian rule to such 
an extent that they often referred to Ukrainians as “Little Russians.”23 Much of 
Russia’s fondness for Ukraine stems from both historical notions24 and the fact 
that they are closely related culturally and linguistically.25 Additionally, eastern 
Ukraine has abundant resources for the steel and agriculture industries,26 
providing an economic incentive for Russia to seize control of the country. 
Ukraine is a diverse country, with over one hundred different national or ethnic 
groups.27 Ethnic Ukrainians make up approximately 78.8% of the population, 
but there is a sizeable minority of 17.3% ethnic Russians.28 Furthermore, while 
the official language of the country is Ukrainian, with 67.5% claiming it as 
their native language, nearly thirty percent of the population claims Russian as 
their native language.29 As a result of their common heritage, history, and 
proximity, the political affairs of Ukraine are inevitably intertwined with 
Russian interests. 
Eastern Ukraine contains more ethnic Russians and therefore has a more 
pro-Russian or Eastern sentiment.30 Western Ukraine is more interested in 
 
 22 Id. at 111. 
 23 Id. at 45. 
 24 Theunis Bates, Ukraine’s Fraught Relationship With Russia: A Brief History, WEEK (Mar. 8, 2014), 
http://theweek.com/article/index/257616/ukraines-fraught-relationship-with-russia-a-brief-history (explaining that 
both Russia and Ukraine trace their roots back to the founding of the first eastern Slavic state, the Kievan Rus, 
which existed from the ninth to the thirteenth centuries); see also KUBICEK, supra note 14, at 27–29 
(examining the various Russian and Ukrainian claims to the heritage of the Kievan Rus and how these 
different claims led to the ideas of Russians seeing Ukraine as theirs and Ukrainians seeing themselves as 
having an independent ethnic identity, separate from that of Russians). 
 25 KUBICEK, supra note 14, at 45. 
 26 Ed Dolan, Ukraine’s Heavy Industry: Glittering Prize or White Elephant?, ECONOMONITOR: ED 
DOLAN’S ECON BLOG (May 5, 2014), http://www.economonitor.com/dolanecon/2014/05/05/ukraines-heavy-industry-
glittering-prize-or-white-elephant/.  
 27 KUBICEK, supra note 14, at 4. 
 28 The World Factbook: Ukraine, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html (last updated June 23, 2014). 
 29 KUBICEK, supra note 14, at 5. 
 30 Id. at 8. 
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Westernization and favors closer ties to the European Union (EU), NATO, and 
the United States.31 Furthermore, the percentage of Ukrainians who identify 
Russian as their primary language is starkly more dramatic in the eastern part 
of the country when compared to the western part of the country.32 The eastern 
provinces of Ukraine have a much higher percentage of people who identify 
Russian as their primary language as compared to the western part of the 
country.33 For example in the eastern provinces, the numbers are often in the 
upper sixtieth and seventieth percentiles, while the numbers in most of the 
western provinces fall well below ten percent.34 This divide results in the 
country having certain political alliances based upon ethnicity. 
C. Political Developments in Ukraine 
In November 2004, Viktor Yanukovych ran for President against Viktor 
Yuschenko in a run-off election.35 Exit polls indicated that Yuschenko had a 
sizeable lead on Yanukovych, and he was expected to win the election.36 
However, the election results showed that Yanukovych had won the majority 
of the votes.37 Ukrainians began accusing Yanukovych of election fraud.38 
Polls in Donetsk, an eastern district of Ukraine, reported one hundred percent 
voter turnout, and was just one of the many districts that had inflated turnout 
rates.39 More interestingly, Russian President Vladimir Putin congratulated 
Yanukovych on his victory two days before the election results were 
released.40 
Thousands of Ukrainians began to rally in Independence Square (“the 
Maidan”) to protest the fraudulent election results.41 In December 2004, the 
Ukrainian Supreme Court demanded a recount, and in January 2005, the 
 
 31 Id. 
 32 See Amy Mantravadi, The Ukraine Crisis Explained in a Series of Maps, CHURCH & STATE (Mar. 6, 
2014), http://amymantravadi.com/2014/03/06/ukraine-crisis-explained-series-maps/.  
 33 See id.  
 34 Id. 
 35 KUBICEK, supra note 14, at 169.  
 36 Id. 
 37 YEKELCHYK, supra note 15, at 216. Yanukovych had 49.5% of the vote while Yuschenko had 46.9%. 
Id. 
 38 Id. at 217 (explaining that Yuschenko and his election advisors had evidence of phone calls made and 
received by Yanukovych’s election advisors revealing election fraud).  
 39 KUBICEK, supra note 14, at 169. 
 40 Id. at 170. 
 41 YEKELCHYK, supra note 15, at 217.  
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Central Electoral Commission declared Yuschenko the victor.42 This would 
later become known as the Orange Revolution.43 It seemed to have tainted 
Yanukovych’s political career in Ukraine, but there was another election 
opportunity in 2010. 
Given the historical development and cultural underpinnings of Ukraine, 
the presidential election in 2010 was a pivotal point in the country’s history 
and set the stage for the 2014 Ukrainian revolution. In February 2010, Viktor 
Yanukovych was elected the President of Ukraine, winning 48.95% of the 
vote.44 Yanukovych’s victory was surprising, given his former history of 
suppressing the democratic process in Ukraine. Yanukovych was widely 
despised in western Ukraine, but had strong support in his native Russian-
speaking eastern and southern Ukraine.45 His presidential platform garnished 
strong support from those parts of the country because they favor closer 
political ties with Russia.46 The 2010 election portrayed Ukraine’s ethnic 
regional divide in political terms and only reaffirmed the notion that the 
country has a split political identity.47 The majority of Yanukovych’s backers 
were from eastern Ukraine.48 The election of Yanukovych, and more 
specifically, his political favor toward Russia, was a major catalyst that 
ostensibly led to the Ukrainian revolution in 2014. 
 
 42 KUBICEK, supra note 14, at 173. 
 43 YEKELCHYK, supra note 15, at 216. 
 44 Final Tally Shows Yanukovich Wins Ukraine Election, CNN (Feb. 10, 2010, 6:22 AM), http://www. 
cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/02/10/ukraine.elections/ (explaining that Yanukovych defeated incumbent Prime 
Minister Yulia Tymoshenko). 
 45 Vladimir Isachenkov & Maria Danilova, Roots and Consequence of Ukraine’s Violence, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS: THE BIG STORY (Feb. 20, 2014, 3:58 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/roots-and-consequences-ukraines-
violence.  
 46 Olexiy Haran & Dmytro Prokopchuk, The Drama of Ukraine’s 2010 Presidential Election, PONARS 
EURASIA POL’Y MEMO NO. 89, at 1, 4 (Univ. of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Mar. 2010), https://www.gwu.edu/ 
~ieresgwu/assets/docs/pepm_089.pdf (“Yanukovych’s presidential campaign team settled on slogans from the 
2004 election as still the best ones for mobilizing their regional electorate: anti-NATO sentiment, promises to 
make Russian the second official state language, and insistence on the absence of a falsified vote in 2004.”).  
 47 See Max Fisher, Ukraine’s Protests Are Back. Here’s Why, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/01/21/ukraines-protests-are-back-heres-why/. 
 48 KUBICEK, supra note 14, at 171. 
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II. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE 2014 UKRAINIAN REVOLUTION 
A. Stepping Toward Russia and Political Rejection 
The Ukrainian revolution, which was primarily fueled by matters of 
political difference, led to the ouster of President Yanukovych, and also made 
Ukraine vulnerable to rebellion in the eastern part of the country. In November 
2013, Yanukovych suspended talks to form a trade deal with the European 
Union.49 The suspension came in the wake of strong pressure from Russia not 
to sign the deal.50 Yanukovych later accepted an economic deal with Russia.51 
Later that same month, Ukrainian unrest, mainly in the western region of the 
country, began as a response to the rejection of the deal.52 In addition, 
Ukrainians were also calling for a restoration of Ukraine’s 2004 Constitution 
because of Yanukovych’s efforts to strengthen his power.53 The protestors saw 
Yanukovych’s actions as contrary to national interests, submissive toward 
Russian interests, and demanded that he change his decision.54 Thousands of 
Ukrainians occupied the Maidan in central Kiev for peaceful protest.55 Western 
Ukrainians were eager to integrate Ukraine with Europe and they viewed 
Yanukovych’s actions as contrary to the overarching goal of moving closer to 
Europe.56 The rallies were peaceful, but violence quickly erupted in January 
after the Parliament passed restrictive laws in order to quell the protests.57 
On February 20, 2014, seventy-seven people were killed in the Maidan 
over a two-day period as fighting broke out between the protestors and 
police.58 As a result of the violence and Yanukovych’s political decisions, 
protestors eventually demanded for Yanukovych’s resignation from the 
 
 49 Ukraine Suspends Preparations for EU Trade Agreement, BBC NEWS: EUR. (Nov. 21, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25032275. 
 50 Id. Russia, as alluded to previously, has been motivated to draw Ukraine closer politically and 
culturally, away from Westernization. See supra Part I.B.  
 51 Fisher, supra note 47. Russia offered Ukraine an economic stimulus of $15 billion and a thirty-three 
percent discount on Russian gas. Id. 
 52 Isachenkov & Danilova, supra note 45.  
 53 Paul D. Shinkman, Ukrainian Government Signs Peace Deal, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 21, 2014, 4:27 PM), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/02/21/ukrainian-government-signs-peace-deal. The restoration of the 
2004 Constitution would have shifted powers from the President to the Parliament. Id. 
 54 See Isachenkov & Danilova, supra note 45. 
 55 Why is Ukraine in Turmoil?, BBC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
25182823.  
 56 See id.  
 57 Isachenkov & Danilova, supra note 45. 
 58 Why is Ukraine in Turmoil?, supra note 55.  
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presidency.59 On February 22nd, the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada)60 
voted to dismiss Yanukovych from office.61 Of the 450 Ukrainian lawmakers, 
328 voted to remove Yanukovych from the presidency on the basis that he had 
abandoned his office and the fact that more than eighty protestors died in the 
Maidan.62 Yanukovych later appeared on television in an interview saying, “I 
am not planning to leave the country. I am the legitimate president, and I am 
not going to resign.”63 Yanukovych had fled the country prior to when the vote 
was taken, and claimed that he was forced to leave due to a threat on his life.64 
The Verkhovna Rada next voted to free Ukraine’s former Prime Minister, 
Yulia Tymoshenko, from prison.65 At a speech in the Maidan, she referred to 
the former government as “a cancer.”66 Olexander Turchynov was appointed 
interim President of Ukraine.67 
The interim government, believing it had acted pursuant to constitutional 
authority, held a new election in May 2014 for the purpose of moving the 
country forward.68 Petro Poroshenko won that election with more than fifty-
five percent of the popular vote.69 Most importantly, the revolution in western 
Ukraine created an equal and opposite reaction in eastern Ukraine.70 Those in 
 
 59 Isachenkov & Danilova, supra note 45. 
 60 KUBICEK, supra note 14, at 10. 
 61 William Booth, Ukraine’s Parliament Votes to Oust President; Former Prime Minister is Freed from 
Prison, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/ukraines-yanukovych-missing-
as-protesters-take-control-of-presidential-residence-in-kiev/2014/02/22/802f7c6c-9bd2-11e3-ad71-
e03637a299c0_story.html.  
 62 Daisy Sindelar, Was Yanukovych’s Ouster Constitutional?, RADIO FREE EUR. RADIO LIBERTY (Feb. 
23, 2014), http://www.rferl.org/content/was-yanukovychs-ouster-constitutional/25274346.html.  
 63 Booth, supra note 61. Yanukovych called the oppositional members of Parliament “bandits” and 
referred to their actions as “illegal.” Id. 
 64 Don Mackay & Nick Sommerlad, Russia Invades Crimea to ‘protect its Black Sea naval fleet’ as 
Ukraine Tensions Soar, MIRROR (Feb. 28, 2014, 9:13 PM), http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/ 
ukraine-news-russia-invades-crimea-3194129. 
 65 Booth, supra note 61. 
 66 Id.  
 67 Harriet Salem, Who Exactly is Governing Ukraine?, GUARDIAN (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www. 
theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/04/who-governing-ukraine-olexander-turchynov. 
 68 Eric Herron, Is Ukraine Ready to Vote?, WASH. POST (May 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/05/18/is-ukraine-ready-to-vote/.  
 69 Petro Poroshenko Claims Ukraine Presidency, BBC NEWS (May 25, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/ 
news/world-europe-27569057. 
 70 Tom Kutsch, Ukrainians in the South and East Oppose Pro-Western Leadership, AL JAZEERA AM. 
(Feb. 27, 2014, 10:03 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/2/27/in-ukraine-s-eastdivision 
notdissolution.html. 
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eastern Ukraine viewed western Ukraine as not having their interest at heart in 
the decision to oust the former President.71 
B. Russia Closes in on Crimea 
The protests in western Ukraine were wrought with tension and caused 
rallies among pro-Russian supporters in eastern Ukraine.72 The rallies were 
especially strong in eastern Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula, where there is a 
strong Russian heritage and connection.73 Soon after the interim government 
was appointed, a group of pro-Russian activists seized government buildings in 
Crimea and raised a Russian flag to challenge the ousting of Yanukovych.74 
The Ukrainian government suspected the pro-Russian activists were being 
supported by Russia in an effort to “undermin[e] national sovereignty.”75 
Russia escalated tensions in Ukraine by invading Crimea.76 
During this invasive measure, Russian troops seized control over the 
international airport in the Crimean capital.77 In March 2014, the Kremlin 
officially announced that Crimea had been annexed to Russia.78 The 
announcement was monumental because it marked the first time since World 
War II that a European country seized land from another.79 The United States 
condemned Russia’s act of aggression with President Barack Obama saying 
“[t]hat is not how international law is supposed to operate.”80 Russia’s invasion 
and annexation of Crimea, while important to understanding the Ukrainian 
 
 71 See id. 
 72 Id. (noting that the protests were inspired by the ousting of Yanukovych and imposition of the new 
pro-western government). 
 73 See Howard Amos, Ukraine Crisis Fuels Secession Calls in Pro-Russian South, GUARDIAN (Feb. 23, 
2014, 2:01 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/23/ukraine-crisis-secession-russian-crimea. In a 
rally in the Sevastopol in Crimea, there were talks of secession and pledges of allegiance to Russia. The 
Crimean peninsula had previously been a part of Russia for sixty years. Id. 
 74 Ukraine Appoints New PM as Armed Men Seize Govt Buildings in Crimea, AL JAZEERA AM. (Feb. 27, 
2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/2/27/armed-men-seize-governmentbuildingsincrimea.html.  
 75 Mark Adomanis, Did Russia Just Invade Crimea?, FORBES (Feb. 28, 2014, 8:04 AM), http://www. 
forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2014/02/28/did-russia-just-invade-crimea/ (internal quotations omitted). 
 76 Mackay & Sommerlad, supra note 64 (“Moscow insisted its soldiers were on a mission to ‘protect 
Black Sea Fleet’s positions.’”). 
 77 Id. 
 78 Englund, supra note 6. President Putin put forth a couple of justifications for the annexation of 
Crimea. One was to protect Russians in eastern Ukraine from abuse by Ukrainian nationalists and the other 
was to assure that the Black Sea Naval Base stayed in Russian territory in the event that Ukraine joined 
NATO. Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Ukraine Crisis: US Condemns Russian ‘aggression,’ BBC NEWS (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/ 
news/world-europe-26441698. 
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crisis, is not a central aspect of this Comment. It is a well-established principle 
of customary international law that the taking of territory through force or 
threat of force is a violation of international law.81 The annexation of Crimea 
was important, however, because it foreshadowed that Russia was willing to 
extend its reach further into eastern Ukraine. 
C. Russia Eyes Eastern Ukraine 
In early March 2014, the Russian Parliament approved President Putin’s 
request to potentially use force in Ukraine to protect Russian interests.82 Later 
that month, President Obama suggested that Russia “move back its troops” 
located near the eastern Ukrainian border in order to ease tensions.83 Russia 
sent troops near the eastern Ukrainian border to protect the pro-Russian 
separatists, who had taken control of government buildings in the Donetsk 
region.84 On April 7th, the separatists once again seized control of government 
buildings in the Donetsk region with the intention of passing a referendum of 
independence from Ukraine.85 The referendum was successful and Moscow 
recognized the results, but western Ukraine denounced the results as 
fraudulent.86 
As the riots and protests in the eastern side of the country escalated, 
Ukraine’s then acting President Olexander Turchynov instituted an “anti-terror 
operation.”87 The operation was unsuccessful, however, as pro-Russian 
 
 81 See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (“All members shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations.”); id. ¶ 6 (applying this principle to states that are not members of the United 
Nations); see also Kellogg-Briand Pact, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796; Elihu Root, The 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations Adopted by the American Institute of International Law, 10 
AM. J. INT’L L. 211, 212–13 (1916) (“Every nation has the right to exist, and to protect and to conserve its 
existence; but this right neither implies the right nor justifies the act of the state to protect itself or to conserve 
its existence by the commission of unlawful acts against innocent and unoffending states.”). 
 82 Ukraine Crisis: Timeline, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275 (last 
updated Nov. 13, 2014). 
 83 Id.  
 84 Charlie D’Agata, Ukrainian City of Donetsk Epitomizes Country’s Crisis, CBS NEWS (Mar. 6, 2014), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukrainian-city-of-donetsk-epitomizes-countrys-crisis/.  
 85 Pro-Russian Protesters Seize Gov’t Buildings in Ukraine’s Donetsk, Lugansk and Kharkov, RT 
(Apr. 7, 2014), http://rt.com/news/ukraine-donetsk-protest-russia-733/.  
 86 Ukraine Crisis: Will the Donetsk Referendum Matter?, BBC NEWS (May 12, 2014), http://www.bbc. 
com/news/world-europe-27344412. Kiev responded by calling the referendum a violation of international law 
and said the voting standards were not transparent, containing massive irregularities. Id.  
 87 Ukraine Says Donetsk ‘anti-terror operation’ Under Way, BBC NEWS (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www. 
bbc.com/news/world-europe-27035196. The aim of the operation was to protect “Ukrainian citizens, to stop 
the terror, to stop the crime, to stop the attempts to tear our country apart.” Id. 
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militants seized six of the armored vehicles sent to stop the terror in the 
region.88 Amidst the violence and escalating tensions, an agreement was made 
between Russia, Ukraine, the United States and the European Union to de-
escalate the crisis.89 As part of the agreement, illegitimate military groups in 
Ukraine were to disband, government buildings seized by the protestors were 
to be vacated, and the pro-Russian separatists were to be granted amnesty.90 
The agreement did not come to fruition, however, because the Russian 
separatists refused to vacate the government buildings.91 
D. A Long, Hot Summer 
In mid-May 2014, NATO announced that there was no evidence that 
Russia had withdrawn any of their troops from the eastern border of Ukraine.92 
For much of the summer months, violent clashes between the Ukrainian 
government and Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine remained the norm.93 
By June 2014, the United Nations (U.N.) estimated that over 400 people had 
been killed in the hostile territory.94 In June, the rebels agreed to a ceasefire, 
but it was short-lived, as the rebels made it clear they had no intention of 
surrendering.95 
In late June, key developments garnered international attention. First, 
President Putin delayed a resolution in Parliament that would have authorized 
Russia to use military force in Ukraine.96 U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry 
 
 88 Ukraine Crisis: Military Column ‘seized’ in Kramatorsk, BBC NEWS (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www. 
bbc.com/news/world-europe-27053500. 
 89 Ukraine Crisis: Deal to ‘de-escalate’ Agreed in Geneva, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.com/ 
news/world-europe-27072351 (last updated Apr. 16, 2014). 
 90 Id.  
 91 Ukraine’s Geneva Agreement Falters, EURACTIV (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.euractiv.com/sections/ 
global-europe/ukraines-geneva-agreement-falters-301668. 
 92 Ukraine Crisis: No Sign of Russia Withdrawal, Says NATO, BBC NEWS (May 19, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27476172. It was estimated there were approximately 40,000 troops 
near the border, and NATO announced, contrary to Russia’s assertion, that there was no evidence that the 
troops have withdrawn—a serious move that would de-escalate the crisis. Id. 
 93 See Ukraine Crisis: Donetsk Sees Deadliest Attack on Troops, BBC NEWS (May 22, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27515514. Pro-Russian separatists killed fourteen people when they 
shot down a military helicopter and took control of two military bases in eastern Ukraine. Ukraine Crisis: 
Timeline, supra note 82. 
 94 Ukraine Fighting: West Warns Russia of Sanctions, BBC NEWS (June 25, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/ 
news/world-europe-28011179. 
 95 David Herszenhorn, Ukrainian President Ends Cease-Fire With Rebels, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/01/world/europe/ukrainian-president-ends-cease-fire-with-rebels.html. 
 96 Ukraine Fighting: West Warns Russia of Sanctions, supra note 94.  
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was pleased by the decision but called on Russia to take more action to stop the 
transfer of arms to separatists in the region.97 The United States deemed 
Putin’s decision to delay the resolution a step in the right direction to de-
escalate the crisis. Second, in a zealous attempt to become more allied with the 
West, Ukraine, among other countries, signed a partnership agreement with the 
European Union.98 The signing of the partnership agreement was a blow to 
Russia, which was worried about the extending sphere of Western influence 
and the impending economic repercussions of having Ukraine favoring 
Western products.99 President Poroshenko described that day as the most 
important in Ukraine’s history since it received its independence in 1991.100 
On July 17, 2014, Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 was shot down over the 
region, killing 298 people.101 There were reports that the plane was shot down 
by pro-Russian rebels.102 Eyewitnesses said they had seen rebels with a BUK 
missile launcher not far from where the plane was shot down.103 In fact, one of 
the eyewitnesses claimed the accents and mannerisms of the individuals with 
the missile launcher were much more like that of Russian soldiers than 
Ukrainian rebels.104 This event grabbed the world’s attention and only 
furthered speculation that Russia was supporting and supplying the rebellion. 
The United States and the European Union imposed sanctions on Russia’s 
energy, banking, and defense industries as a result.105 In reaction to the 
imposed sanctions from the West, Putin counter-measured by implementing a 
full embargo against the United States and the European Union on fruit, 
vegetables, and dairy products.106 
 
 97 Id.  
 98 EU Signs Pacts with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, BBC NEWS (June 27, 2014), http://www.bbc. 
com/news/world-europe-28052645. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 MH17 Crash: Dutch Experts Say Numerous Objects Hit the Plane, BBC NEWS (Sept. 9, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29119024.  
 102 Id. 
 103 John Sweeney, MH17 Disaster: Russians ‘controlled BUK missile system,’ BBC NEWS (Sept. 8, 
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29109398. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Justyna Pawlak & Eric Beech, EU and U.S. Announce New Sanctions on Russia over Ukraine, 
REUTERS (July 29, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/29/us-ukraine-crisis-east-idUSKBN0 
FY0OX20140729. 
 106 Ukraine Crisis: Timeline, supra note 82.  
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E. Russia Invades Ukraine and NATO Responds 
Russia invaded Ukraine in August 2014. After the invasion, there was a 
swarming dialogue of culpability between Russia, Ukraine, and the United 
States.107 Many countries officially condemned the invasion, and much of the 
world’s leaders were skeptical of Russia’s assertions that it was not sending 
troops to fight alongside the rebels.108 Prior to the August invasion, multiple 
reports surfaced that three Russian tanks invaded Ukraine in June.109 On 
August 28th, the Russian Presidential Human Rights Council reported that one 
hundred Russians were killed in the Donetsk province on August 13th while 
they were driving an ammunition truck.110 Both of these reports confirmed the 
world’s suspicions that Russia was operating in Ukraine. On August 22nd, 
NATO announced that the Russian military moved artillery units manned by 
Russian soldiers onto Ukrainian soil.111 Furthermore, Ukraine’s army released 
a statement indicating that “up to 100” Russian tanks, army vehicles, and 
rocket launchers were seen traveling in eastern Ukraine.112 
In another invasive measure, Russia sent five “armored personnel carriers” 
to Ukraine in support of the pro-Russian separatists in the Donetsk and 
Luhansk provinces.113 A Ukrainian officer labeled the incursion as a “full-scale 
invasion” and a U.S. official said approximately 1,000 Russian soldiers 
 
 107 See Uri Friedman, Russia’s Slow-Motion Invasion of Ukraine, ATLANTIC (Aug. 29, 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/russias-stealthy-slow-motion-invasion-of-
ukraine/379312/. Russia denies any incursion, Ukraine confirms there is an invasion, and the United States, for 
diplomatic reasons, has decided to label Russia’s actions as a “pattern of escalating aggression.” Id. 
 108 Laura Smith-Spark, Matthew Chance & Michael Martinez, Obama Skeptical of Ceasefire Talks 
Between Russia and Ukraine, CNN (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/03/world/europe/ukraine-
crisis/; see also Merkel Skeptical About Russia’s Pledge to Pull Back Troops From Ukraine Border, MOSCOW 
TIMES (Oct. 13, 2014), http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/merkel-sceptical-about-russia-s-pledge-
to-pull-back-troops-from-ukraine-border/509342.html. 
 109 Ukraine Says ‘Russian Tank Incursion’ Unacceptable, BBC NEWS (June 12, 2014), http://www.bbc. 
com/news/world-europe-27815441. President Petro Poroshenko told President Putin that the incursion was 
unacceptable, but Russia denied any involvement in such an invasive measure. Id. 
 110 Thomas Grove, Over 100 Russian Soldiers Killed in Single Ukraine Battle - Russian Rights Activists, 
REUTERS (Aug. 28, 2014), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/08/28/uk-ukraine-crisis-russia-casualties-
idUKKBN0GS20H20140828. Three hundred more soldiers were wounded. Id. 
 111 Michael Gordon, Russia Moves Artillery Units into Ukraine, NATO Says, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/23/world/europe/russia-moves-artillery-units-into-ukraine-nato-says.html.  
 112 Ukraine Conflict: Russian Soldiers Seen With “up to 100” Military Vehicles in Ukrainian Villages, 
ABC NEWS, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-08-28/russians-soldiers-seen-with-military-vehicles-in-
ukraine/5701894 (last updated Aug. 27, 2014).  
 113 Andrew Kramer & Michael Gordon, Ukraine Reports Russian Invasion on a New Front, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/world/europe/ukraine-russia-novoazovsk-crimea.html.  
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invaded the southern border to assist the pro-Russian separatists.114 
Additionally, NATO said there were approximately 20,000 Russian troops 
stationed at the eastern Ukrainian border.115 Conditions in eastern Ukraine 
further deteriorated when ten Russian paratroopers were captured by Ukrainian 
forces and were exchanged for sixty-three Ukrainian soldiers.116 President 
Putin called for talks of statehood in eastern Ukraine, and the European Union 
warned of further sanctions against Russia if it did not de-escalate the crisis.117 
This invasion sparked international outrage, and the NATO Secretary-
General accused Russia of committing a “blatant violation” of Ukraine’s 
sovereignty by engaging in direct military operations to support pro-Russian 
rebels.118 NATO condemned Russia by saying its troops “illegally crossed the 
border” in an attempt to destabilize the country.119 Russia denied the 
allegations, but NATO released satellite imagery revealing a vast number of 
Russian troops in Ukraine.120 British Prime Minister David Cameron stated 
Russia’s actions in eastern Ukraine “must cease immediately.”121 NATO and 
the United States vowed to strengthen economic sanctions against Russia if it 
did not “step back.”122 
Due to Russia’s unwillingness to comply with these NATO and U.S. 
demands, NATO created a readiness force of potentially up to 3,000-5,000 
troops to deal with Russia.123 The soldiers would be able to respond to any 
crisis within a matter of days.124 This countermeasure was done in the event 
 
 114 Victoria Butenko, Laura Smith-Spark & Diana Magnay, U.S. Official Says 1,000 Russian Troops Have 
Entered Ukraine, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/28/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/ (last updated Aug. 29, 
2014).  
 115 NATO Members ‘start arms deliveries to Ukraine,’ supra note 3. 
 116 Ukraine and Russia Exchange Captured Troops, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-29002147 (last updated Aug. 31, 2014).  
 117 Putin ‘urges talks on statehood for east Ukraine,’ BBC NEWS (Aug. 31, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/ 
news/world-europe-29003116.  
 118 Doug Stanglin, NATO Accuses Russia of Violating Ukraine’s Sovereignty, USA TODAY (Aug. 29, 
2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/08/29/ukraine-russia-friday/14785073/. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id.; see also Stanglin, supra note 118.  
 121 Butenko, Smith-Spark & Magnay, supra note 114.  
 122 Carol Morello, NATO Official Warns of More Sanctions if Russia Does Not ‘step back from the brink,’ 
WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russia-detains-ukrainian-military-
officers-who-fled-attacks-by-pro-moscow-rebels/2014/08/07/8613c994-1e27-11e4-ab7b-696c295ddfd1_story. 
html.  
 123 Adrian Croft, NATO to Create New ‘spearhead’ Force to Respond to Crises, REUTERS (Sept. 1, 2014, 
1:38 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/01/us-ukraine-crisis-nato-military-idUSKBN0GW2SP2014 
0901. 
 124 Id. 
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that Russia invaded a NATO territory, like Poland or the Baltics.125 NATO 
also sent more fighter aircrafts to the Baltic region and increased military 
exercises in Eastern Europe.126 Russia responded by threatening to send more 
troops to Crimea.127 The goal of NATO’s exercises was to show Russia that 
NATO countries have a serious commitment to one another, and that if one is 
attacked or under threat of aggression, then all would come to the aid of their 
ally.128 
In mid-September 2014, Ukrainian Colonel General Valery Heletey 
announced that NATO members had started providing arms to the Ukrainian 
government to help them fight the pro-Russian separatists.129 The names of the 
countries that delivered the weapons had been withheld, as had the types of 
weapons provided.130 Other members denied the statement, but this denial was 
expected.131 Ukraine’s Prime Minister said that NATO was the only major line 
of defense to protect the country from Russian aggression.132 Although NATO 
and the United States have not formally intervened in the conflict in a military 
sense, they have taken a stand to support the current Ukrainian government.133 
Later that month, there were ceasefire agreements between Ukraine and the 
rebels, but these agreements did not last long,134 and many believe the 
ceasefires will never bring permanent peace to the region.135 Tensions between 
the West and Russia are the highest they have been since the end of the Cold 
War. Russia is still supporting the pro-Russian separatists through training and 
 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Russia Threatens to Send More Troops to Crimea over NATO Military Exercise, Ukraine Ratifies EU 
Deal, ABC NEWS, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-17/russia-threatens-more-troops-in-retaliation-to-nato-
exercise/5748878 (last updated Sept. 16, 2014). 
 128 Croft, supra note 123. 
 129 See NATO Members ‘start arms deliveries to Ukraine,’ supra note 3. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 NATO Arming Ukraine with Soviet Weapons – Deputy PM Rogozin, RT (July 4, 2014, 10:23 AM), 
http://rt.com/news/170388-rogozin-ukraine-arms-europe/.  
 134 See Andrei Makhovsky, Ukraine, Pro-Russian Rebels Reach Ceasefire Deal, REUTERS (Sept. 5, 2014, 
6:40 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/05/us-ukraine-crisis-idUSKBN0GZ18D20140905; see also 
Laura Smith-Spark & Christine Theodorou, Report: Ukraine, Pro-Russia Rebels Agree to New Ceasefire Deal, 
CNN (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/20/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/; Shaun Walker, Ukraine 
Ceasefire Breached in Donetsk and Mariupol, GUARDIAN (Sept. 7, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/06/eastern-ukraine-ceasefire-russia.  
 135 See James Marson, Truce in Ukraine Spawns Hope, Doubt in West; Ukraine, Russia-Backed Rebels 
Agree, But U.S. Europe Keep Sanctions Pressure on Moscow, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.wsj. 
com/articles/russia-ukraine-and-rebels-meeting-in-minsk-for-talks-on-cease-fire-1409913376.  
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by supplying them with ammunitions.136 As of November 4, 2014, Russian 
troops had moved closer to the eastern border, and more than 4,000 people had 
died in the face of the conflict.137 
III. NATO’S PURPOSE AND SYSTEMATIC LIMITATIONS 
In order to understand NATO, it is best to analyze its main purpose and its 
historical development. Specifically, it is best to know NATO’s operational 
constraints and limitations. Knowing how NATO works in the face of conflict 
is important for understanding the recent developments in Ukraine. 
On April 4, 1989, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed and NATO was 
formed.138 The main purpose of NATO is to “safeguard the freedom and 
security of its members through political and military means.”139 It was 
founded to deter Soviet expansion into Western Europe and to promote 
European integration after the destruction of World War II;140 it currently has 
twenty-eight members.141 It serves as the main defense structure in Western 
Europe, and the preservation of Ukraine’s independence has been of special 
interest to it.142 NATO’s interest in Ukraine makes political and practical sense 
considering Ukraine essentially acts as a buffer between Russia and Europe. 
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty empowers NATO to act.143 It permits 
collective military defense among each NATO member and considers an attack 
on one member to be an attack on all members.144 NATO is being tested in a 
way it never hoped to be. Ukraine is still not a member of NATO,145 and it 
 
 136 Butenko, Smith-Spark & Magnay, supra note 114. 
 137 Croft, supra note 123. 
 138 A Short History of NATO, NATO, www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2015). 
 139 NATO’s Purpose, NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_68144.htm (last updated Oct. 13, 
2015). 
 140 See A Short History of NATO, supra note 138. 
 141 Member Countries, NATO, www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52044.htm (last updated Aug. 20, 
2013). The current NATO members are: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and the 
United States. Id. 
 142 LEONID POLYAKOV, UKRAINE-NATO RELATIONS AND NEW PROSPECTS FOR PEACEKEEPING 72 (2003). 
 143 North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Ukraine to Hold Nato Vote When Membership Criteria Are Met, BBC NEWS (Nov. 24, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30176256; see also POLYAKOV, supra note 142, at 6, 9. The country 
does partner with the alliance in the partnership for peace program, but that provides no support for military 
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does not appear that it will become a member in the near future.146 As a result, 
NATO cannot militarily engage Russia. However, if Russia takes over 
Ukraine, there is a strong and impending danger that Russia will try to 
overtake more NATO countries in Europe. This leaves NATO in the 
precarious position to either help Ukraine or let the fire spread closer to 
Western Europe. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. Introduction to Legal Issues 
This Part will first examine what NATO may legally do to assist non-
member states by referring to the accepted uses of force in both the U.N. and 
NATO Charters. It will then focus on the Kosovo bombing campaign as a case 
study. Next, it will examine whether the current Ukrainian government is 
legitimate. Eastern Ukraine has rejected and revolted against the current 
government in Kiev, resulting in Ukraine being more divided than ever. The 
question of legitimacy has profound implications for whether NATO may 
provide military assistance of any form to the Ukrainian government so it can 
secure its legitimacy over the eastern part of the country without violating 
international law.147 If the government is not legitimate, then the United States 
and other NATO countries, in the contribution of arms to the current Ukrainian 
government, are violating customary international law and the ICJ’s decision 
in Nicaragua v. United States.148 In Part V, this Comment touches on the right 
of self-determination. More specifically, it will examine whether eastern 
Ukraine may engage in external self-determination to unite with Russia, a 
country with which it has closer ethnic, cultural, and political ties. 
 
intervention. Additionally, there is not been overwhelming popular support among Ukrainians to formally join 
the alliance. Id. 
 146 Johannes Wamberg Anderson, NATO Deepening Cooperation with Ukraine, But Membership Far 
Away, KYIV POST (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.kyivpost.com/content/kyiv-post-plus/nato-deepening-
cooperation-with-ukraine-but-membership-far-away-398628.html; POLYAKOV, supra note 142, at 18–19. 
Ukraine may not be able to comply with NATO membership criteria. Furthermore the country would probably 
lag behind other NATO members in terms of GDP and defense expenditures. POLYAKOV, supra note 142, at 
18–19. 
 147 See infra Part IV.D.  
 148 See generally Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). 
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B. Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the U.N. Charter and Article 5 of the NATO 
Charter 
NATO is constrained by the U.N. Charter for when it may resort to force. 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter provides that the use of force against another 
state is prohibited, unless an exception applies.149 The United Nations, which is 
charged with the goal of preventing aggressive wars and maintaining 
international peace, has carved out two exceptions in its Charter for when the 
use of force or threat of force may be invoked. First, Article 51 of the U.N. 
Charter recognizes a country’s right to self-defense in the event of an armed 
attack.150 Second, the U.N. Security Council may vote to engage in the use of 
force against a state, so long as nine votes are received from the fifteen-
member chamber, with unanimous consent from the five permanent members 
(China, Britain, Russia, the United States, and France).151 The authority for this 
latter measure comes from Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and is best known 
as “collective security.”152 There are two articles in the U.N. Charter that 
provide measures for how the United Nations may engage in the “collective 
security” measure. Article 42 authorizes the Security Council to take action by 
“air, sea, or land forces” should measures provided in Article 41 be inadequate 
to accomplish the stated goal.153 The purpose of these two exceptions is to 
preserve “existing territorial and political arrangements,” not to transform them 
or acquire new territory.154 
An additional method by which state intervention may be justified is if a 
state consents to another state intervening in its affairs.155 Although this 
method is not referenced in the U.N. Charter, it has been accepted as a 
 
 149 See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.  
 150 U.N. Charter art. 51 (establishing that self-defense is an “inherent right” in the event an armed attack 
occurs). 
 151 DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 235 (3d ed. 2010).  
 152 CORNELIU BJOLA, LEGITIMISING THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: KOSOVO, IRAQ AND 
THE ETHICS OF INTERVENTIONS 48–49 (2009). 
 153 Compare U.N. Charter art. 42 (“Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in 
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land 
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include 
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.”), 
with U.N. Charter art. 41 (“These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of 
rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic 
relations.”). 
 154 BJOLA, supra note 152, at 48.  
 155 Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 824, 824 (1999); 
See also BEDERMAN, supra note 151, at 229.  
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normative standard in customary international law.156 To summarize, the 
following are justifications for the use of force of one state against another 
state: Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, a valid U.N. Security Council vote to 
engage in collective security, and the customary international law norm of a 
state’s consent to intervention.157  
It is highly unlikely the U.N. Charter would be of any assistance to NATO 
or the United States in coming to Ukraine’s aid.158 Although Article 51 permits 
Ukraine to use force by way of self-defense, it does not permit NATO to act. 
Furthermore, a vote by the U.N. Security Council would be a practical 
impossibility because Russia would never vote for intervention on behalf of 
Ukraine. Russia could (and likely would) veto any action taken by the Security 
Council because it is a permanent member. Additionally, since seizing control 
of Ukraine is in Russia’s economic and political interest, it would not vote for 
intervention.159 
Consent is another means by which Ukraine may allow the United States or 
NATO and its members to intervene. Although Ukraine has given consent for 
NATO to intervene,160 consent is not a valid justification in this situation. This 
Comment argues that the current Ukrainian government is illegitimate and 
does not have effective control of the territory it purports to govern.161 Consent 
may only be given by a legitimate government that has “effective control of 
most [if not all] of the state.”162 
Since the U.N. Charter is a roadblock to NATO action, Article 5 of the 
NATO Charter must provide the legal basis. NATO, as a collective self-
defense organization, may be able to use Article 5 to justify the use of force, 
but only if the force is used in the face of state aggression. Article 5 of NATO 
 
 156 David Wippman, Military Intervention, Regional Organizations, and Host-State Consent, 7 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 209, 209 (1996). 
 157 This consent is meaningless and invalid if the Ukrainian government is deemed illegitimate. See infra 
Part IV.D. 
 158 Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter is another important provision. It essentially prohibits U.N. members 
from interfering in the internal affairs of other states. The dissenters protesting in eastern Ukraine is an internal 
affair of Ukraine. According to Article 2(7), NATO must not intervene in Ukraine. This Comment argues that 
NATO is intervening with the supply of weapons, thus violating Article 2(7) and using force in violation of 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶¶ 4, 7. 
 159 See supra Part II.C. 
 160 Vasudevan Sridharan, Ukraine Asks Nato to Intervene in the Face of Russian Invasion Threat, INT’L 
BUS. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2014), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/ukraine-asks-nato-intervene-face-russian-invasion-
threat-1438523. 
 161 See infra Part IV.D. 
 162 Wippman, supra note 156, at 209.  
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is based on the principles set forth in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. It expands 
the right of self-defense by imposing an obligation on each member to come to 
the defense of an attacked member. However, NATO must still seek U.N. 
approval if it hopes to use force on behalf of a nation that is not a member of 
NATO.163 As with any treaty, only members to the North Atlantic Treaty may 
rely on Article 5.164 Article 5 has a dual function by acting as a requirement 
and a restriction. It posits an obligation among each NATO member to take up 
arms for any other member that is attacked and at the same time limits that 
obligation to its members. 
The question then becomes: what options does NATO have in using force 
to preserve Ukraine’s sovereignty? NATO members are obliged to take up 
arms and defend only other members who are attacked or under threat of 
attack.165 Ukraine is not a member of the alliance and thus Article 5, the 
building block of NATO, cannot be a justification for intervening on behalf of 
the country.166 NATO must provide some alternative justification for any type 
of intervention. There is historical precedent with respect to NATO acting on 
behalf of non-NATO members, with Kosovo being the most prominent 
example. This example implicates the past problems NATO has had in 
searching for justifications that excuses their intervention in the affairs of a 
non-member state, and also shows the options NATO may be able utilize with 
respect to Ukraine. 
C. The Intervention in Kosovo 
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was largely motivated by a moral and 
ethical imperative, which had scant or menial legal justifications and was 
comprised of humanitarian intervention and the maintenance of security in 
Europe. 
Historically, ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo had been oppressed by the 
Serbian population.167 In the late 1990s, Serbian forces, under the leadership of 
Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milošević, began committing massacres 
 
 163 Marjorie Cohn, The Myth of Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, in LESSONS OF KOSOVO: THE 
DANGERS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 121, 131 (Aleksandar Jokic ed., 2003). 
 164 See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5. 
 165 See supra Part III. 
 166 Id. 
 167 ELLEN HALLAMS, THE UNITED STATES AND NATO SINCE 9/11: THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE 
RENEWED 36 (2010). 
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against Albanians living in Kosovo to drive them out of the area.168 NATO was 
fearful that the fighting between the Kosovo Liberation Army and the 
Yugoslav army would develop into a systematic ethnic cleansing of the 
Albanian minority.169 In 1999, NATO began bombing Serbian targets in 
Kosovo without U.N. authorization, with the intention of forcing Milošević to 
withdraw his armed forces from Kosovo.170 U.N. authorization for the mission 
was not sought because it was a foregone conclusion that two of the five 
permanent members of the Security Council, Russia and China, would veto 
any vote to intervene in Kosovo.171 The air campaign lasted seventy-eight 
days, Milošević withdrew his forces, and, in the end, NATO prevailed.172  
NATO’s decision to intervene on behalf of Kosovo against Yugoslavia 
was, and has remained, controversial. The decision remains controversial 
because no NATO country was attacked or under the threat of attack, yet 
NATO acted anyway. The thrust behind the intervention seemed to come from 
the eagerness of NATO countries to “avert a moral, humanitarian 
catastrophe.”173 Another reason for NATO’s action stemmed from the idea of 
asserting NATO’s dominance in the post-Cold War era.174 In short, NATO’s 
action against Yugoslavia stemmed more from a higher ethical and moral 
imperative than any legal basis or treaty obligation. 
1. NATO’s Legal Justifications for Intervention in Kosovo 
Notwithstanding NATO’s ethical and moral motivations to act in Kosovo, 
the action could only be legal if NATO acted within the parameters established 
by the U.N. or NATO Charters. The U.N. Charter provides no legal 
justification for NATO’s use of force, and the NATO Charter also fails to 
provide any legal justification for NATO’s actions in Kosovo. NATO gave two 
reasons for intervening in Kosovo: humanitarian intervention and a “risk to 
regional stability.” 
 
 168 IVO DAALDER & MICHAEL O’HANLON, WINNING UGLY: NATO’S WAR TO SAVE KOSOVO 1–3 (2000). 
 169 Adam Roberts, NATO’s ‘Humanitarian War’ Over Kosovo, 41 SURVIVAL 102, 104 (1999).  
 170 HALLAMS, supra note 167, at 40.  
 171 Richard Falk, Humanitarian Intervention After Kosovo, in LESSONS OF KOSOVO: THE DANGERS OF 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 31, 35 (Aleksandar Jokic ed., 2003). 
 172 DAALDER & O’HANLON, supra note 168, at 3.  
 173 HALLAMS, supra note 167, at 38–39 (“UK Defence Minister George Robertson cited the need to 
‘reduce the Serbs capacity to repress the Albanian population and thus avert a humanitarian disaster.’”). U.S. 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said, “[w]e are not going to stand by and watch Serb authorities do in 
Kosovo what they can no longer get away with doing in Bosnia,” that being ethnic cleansing. Id. 
 174 Falk, supra note 171, at 35.  
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a. Article 5 of the U.N. and NATO Charters 
NATO did not seek a U.N. Security Council vote to authorize the 
intervention because Russia and China would have inevitably rejected the 
request.175 Moreover, Article 53 of the U.N. Charter176 posed an additional 
obstacle to NATO. Article 53 prohibits “regional enforcement actions” taken 
by “regional organizations” without a U.N. Security Council vote.177 Article 53 
does not prohibit NATO from acting on behalf of another NATO country; 
Article 51 provides an independent basis for that action.178 NATO claimed that 
Article 53 did not restrain its ability to act collectively because it was an 
“alliance” and not a “regional organization.”179 However, this interpretation is 
unreasonable because it would allow NATO to circumvent U.N. Security 
Council authorization at any time.180 As such, the United Nations considers 
NATO to be a “regional organization” constrained by Article 53.181 
Since the U.N. Charter provided no legal basis for intervening, the legal 
justification had to derive from Article 5 of the NATO Charter. However, 
Article 5 of the NATO Charter was inapplicable to the situation in Kosovo 
because the country was not a member of NATO. Article 5 obligates the 
signatories to collective self-defense and could not be used in favor of Kosovo. 
Furthermore, no NATO country was under the threat of attack. Given the 
limited number of legal bases available to NATO in the decision to intervene 
in Kosovo, there was a scramble among NATO members and the international 
community to find some legal justification for the intervention. 
b. Humanitarian Intervention 
Although NATO countries could not base their decision to intervene on the 
NATO Charter,182 Germany and Belgium were the only two NATO countries 
to give humanitarian intervention as the official legal basis for the Kosovo 
 
 175 See supra Part IV.B. 
 176 See U.N. Charter art. 53, ¶ 1 (“The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional 
arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken 
under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council . . . .”).  
 177 Falk, supra note 171, at 36. 
 178 Id. at 50. 
 179 See id. at 36.  
 180 The anti-interventionists rejected this argument. Id. 
 181 Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (1999). 
 182 No NATO member was attacked or under threat of attack. See infra Part IV.C.1.a. 
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bombings.183 Humanitarian intervention is, perhaps, the most legitimate reason 
for acting in Kosovo. Even then, humanitarian intervention straddles the line of 
legitimacy and basks in a twilight zone, at least with respect to intervention 
and the U.N. Charter.184 Even though the actions of NATO were condemned, it 
was given some form of ratification by the U.N. Security Council.185 Kosovo 
serves as an example of an emerging form of intervention. NATO is not likely 
to engage in this sort of action with Ukraine, however, because the 
humanitarian reasons to do so are rather weak, and it would receive great 
scrutiny from the international community as another circumvention of the 
United Nations. The issue in Kosovo was ethnic cleansing, but the issue in 
Ukraine is primarily one of political and territorial integrity. These are 
different issues and humanitarian intervention in Ukraine would be an 
insufficient reason to intervene. 
The ICJ spoke on the issue of humanitarian intervention when Yugoslavia 
sued NATO countries because of the bombing.186 The Court had to dismiss the 
case on a jurisdictional basis, but did say “[t]he Court is profoundly concerned 
with the use of force in Yugoslavia and that it raised very serious questions of 
international law.”187 The only time the Court came close to prescribing a legal 
standard on humanitarian intervention was in Nicaragua v. United States, 
discussed later in this Comment, where the Court prescribed that the excessive 
use of force by the United States could not be the “appropriate means” to 
ensure respect for human rights.188 
c. Regional Instability Argument 
NATO countries gave another reason for the bombing campaign. As 
mentioned earlier, only two NATO countries, Germany and Belgium, gave 
humanitarian intervention as the reason for the campaign.189 Other NATO 
countries said that there was a “need to bring stability to the region” and 
 
 183 JOHAN D. VAN DER VYVER, IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 233 
(2010). 
 184 Cohn, supra note 163, at 136.  
 185 VAN DER VYVER, supra note 183, at 233–34.  
 186 Cohn, supra note 163, at 136.  
 187 Id.  
 188 The ICJ said that an attack must be compatible with the aim of humanitarian intervention. Id. at 136–
37.  
 189 See supra Part IV.C.1.b. 
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“prevent instability spreading in the region.”190 However, while Article 2 of the 
NATO Charter mentions “promoting conditions of stability and well-being,”191 
the nature of that broad objective is limited to NATO parties. It provides no 
legal approach to justify intervention against a non-NATO member and 
therefore lends no credence to the regional instability argument. 
2. NATO’s Kosovo Campaign and its Effect on Ukraine 
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was the most recent example of NATO 
flexing its muscles for the purpose of stabilizing peace and security in Europe. 
NATO could proffer an ethical and moral argument for the actions it took in 
Kosovo, but it would not be able to support the argument with a legitimate 
legal basis. Article 5 was inapplicable, Article 51 was inapplicable, and the 
United Nations gave no authorization under Chapter VII.192 It stretched legal 
parameters thin in search for a justification, and the intervention was 
condemned as an international travesty. The circumstances of ethnic cleansing 
or genocide may cause NATO to act in this way in the future, but no such 
justification can be used to intervene on behalf of Ukraine. While there have 
been deaths in Ukraine, it does not rise to the level of ethnic cleansing or 
justify any such use of the phrase “humanitarian intervention.”193 
Kosovo’s intervention is inapposite to intervention in Ukraine because of 
the lack of a humanitarian crisis. If NATO wants to legitimately intervene in 
Ukraine, then it must get U.N. approval. However, seeking approval would be 
futile, considering Russia would veto any such self-condemning measure. 
NATO’s hopes to intervene, even with Kosovo looming in the background as 
precedent for intervention on behalf of a non-NATO member, are not likely to 
be fulfilled because U.N. approval is not available and humanitarian 
 
 190 Nina Graeger & Alexandra Novosseloff, The Role of the OSCE and the EU, in THE UNITED NATIONS 
AND REGIONAL SECURITY 75, 87 (Michael Pugh & Waheguru P. Singh Sidhu eds., 2003).  
 191 North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 4, art. 2. 
 192 BJOLA, supra note 152, at 104. Although the Security Council did not give express authorization for 
NATO to act, it did give them some blessings by enacting Resolutions 1160 and 1203, which called for 
violence to stop in Kosovo and expressed concern about the situation in Kosovo as a threat to the “peace and 
security” in the region, respectively. Id. 
 193 Compare BJOLA, supra note 152, at 58 (explaining that the number of refugees in Kosovo was north of 
800,000 and at least 10,500 Kosovar Albanians had been killed by the Serbs when Milošević capitulated, and 
there had been a long history of animus among the Serbians for the Kosovar Albanians), and Brendan Stone, 
The U.S.-NATO Military Intervention in Kosovo: Triggering Ethnic Conflict as a Pretext for Intervention, 
GLOBAL RES. (Dec. 29, 2005), http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-u-s-nato-military-intervention-in-kosovo/ 
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justifications are weak. NATO cannot look to Kosovo as a justification to 
intervene in Ukraine, barring the occurrence of some drastic humanitarian 
event. 
Notwithstanding these conclusions, NATO has decided to assist Ukraine in 
more than one aspect. Although the intervention is not based on direct military 
engagement, it does positively affect Ukraine’s ability to thwart off Russian 
aggression, even if it is a slight effect. Multiple reports have stated that NATO 
countries have begun sending non-lethal military weapons to the Ukrainian 
government to assist in suppressing the dissenters in eastern Ukraine, although 
some NATO countries have either (expectedly) denied this report or declined 
to comment.194 President Obama made it clear that NATO needed to make 
“concrete commitments” to help Ukraine modernize and strengthen its military 
forces.195 Furthermore, NATO surveillance planes have given information to 
Ukraine that the country may not have obtained otherwise.196 In early February 
2015, there were serious discussions between the United States and NATO to 
assist the Ukrainian government in obtaining lethal weapons.197 
Providing lethal weapons to Ukraine is a patent violation of international 
law according to Nicaragua.198 Providing non-lethal weapons may not appear 
to be as patent a violation; however, this Comment argues that they constitute a 
use of force for two reasons. First, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) 
defined non-lethal weapons as weapons that are “designed and primarily 
employed to incapacitate personnel or materiel immediately, while minimizing 
fatalities . . . .”199 By definition, the DOD admits that fatalities may occur as a 
result of non-lethal weapons, and there is no reason to preclude non-lethal 
 
 194 See NATO Members ‘start arms deliveries to Ukraine,’ supra note 3; see also Stephen Lendman, U.S.-
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Sept. 14, 2014). 
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weapons from the guise of Article (2)(4). Second, it is conceivable to say that 
non-lethal weapons could be seen as using force against the dissenters in 
eastern Ukraine.200 Use of force need not always be lethal. The ICJ envisioned 
scenarios that involved the use of force that may not rise to the level of lethal 
or armed attacks.201 This Comment adopts the view that non-lethal weapons 
constitute “use of force” under the U.N. Charter.202 
D. Ukraine’s Current Government and its Legitimacy 
NATO responded to Russia’s invasion of Crimea by strengthening their 
forces in Eastern Europe, imposing sanctions on Russia, and delivering arms to 
the Ukrainian government.203 By intervening in this conflict, NATO is 
providing arms to an illegitimate government. The current government in Kiev 
was placed into power with little regard for due process and was not 
established legally. Specifically, the Verkhovna Rada’s removal of President 
Yanukovych was unconstitutional.204 The interim government had no authority 
to establish the elections subsequent to the ouster. In addition, the current 
government, which would not be in power but for Ukraine’s unconstitutional 
ouster, does not have effective control over Ukraine. 
1. Legitimacy Requirements of a Government 
As a political matter, many states no longer weigh in on the legitimacy of 
foreign governments.205 This abstention from making validity judgments stems 
from what is known as the Estrada Doctrine and is premised on the idea of a 
state not interfering with, or sitting in judgment of, another state’s internal 
affairs.206 Regardless of the political decisions countries make, there is a legal 
test that a government must meet in order to be considered legitimate. Three 
cases set forth the criteria for a government to be considered legitimate: 
Republic of Somalia v. Woodhouse Drake & Carey,207 Great Britain v. Costa 
 
 200 See David Fidler, The International Legal Implications of “Non-Lethal” Weapons, 21 MICH. J. INT’L 
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Rica (“Tinoco Arbitration”),208 and Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of 
Cyprus v. Feldman (“Northern Cyprus”).209 Somalia sets forth the basic 
criteria for governmental legitimacy,210 while the latter two cases primarily 
focus on a single factor of the basic criteria.211 
Somalia establishes four legal factors for determining whether a 
government is legitimate.212 It was presented to the Queen’s Bench Division, 
which is one of the three divisions of the High Court of Justice of England and 
Wales (the “High Court”).213 At the time Judge Hobhouse heard the case, the 
United Kingdom embraced the Estrada Doctrine by promulgating the 
following declaration: 
We have conducted a re-examination of British policy and practice 
concerning the recognition of governments. This has included a 
comparison with the practice of our partners and allies. On the basis 
of this review, we have decided that we shall no longer accord 
recognition to governments . . . . Like them, we shall continue to 
decide the nature of our dealings with regimes which come to power 
unconstitutionally in the light of our assessment of whether they are 
able of themselves to exercise effective control of the territory of the 
State concerned, and seem likely to continue to do so.214 
Nevertheless, the High Court felt this was unhelpful and decided to provide 
a legal test to determine whether the Somalia government was legitimate.215 
The basic facts of Somalia are as follows. In 1991, the Republic of Somalia 
purchased a cargo of rice, but it was never delivered because the master of the 
ship considered the port dangerous due to fighting in the country.216 The rice 
was sold and the proceeds were placed in a court in London.217 Somalia 
demanded the proceeds to be delivered to the government, but the High Court 
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 210 Somalia, Q.B. 54 at 68. 
 211 Gr. Brit.,1 R.I.A.A. at 382; see also Northern Cyprus, 917 F.2d at 293 (quoting Williams v. Bruffy, 96 
U.S. 176, 24 L. Ed. 716 (1878)).  
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rejected the demand because there was doubt as to whether the representative 
making the demand had the appropriate authority to do so.218 Somalia was 
under an interim government at the time of the demand due to civil war.219 
Judge Hobhouse set forth the following legal analysis for assessing whether a 
government could indeed be deemed legitimate: 
(a) [W]hether it is the constitutional government of the state; (b) the 
degree, nature and stability of administrative control, if any, that it of 
itself exercises over the territory of the state; (c) whether Her 
Majesty’s Government has any dealings with it and if so what is the 
nature of those dealings; and (d) in marginal cases, the extent of 
international recognition that it has as the government of the state.220 
The High Court ruled that on the first three factors, the government making 
the demand was illegitimate, and thus had no authority to make such a demand 
for the proceeds.221 The High Court did not analyze the fourth factor since the 
government failed the first three factors. 
The test in Somalia provides the courts with clear guidance when assessing 
whether a government is legitimate. A government can be legitimate either de 
jure or de facto. If the government is established de jure, then there should be 
an automatic presumption of validity. However, if the government that 
purports to exist is not derived by lawful means, then it is a de facto 
government. Generally, a de facto government will be accorded legitimacy 
only if it maintains effective control over the territory it purports to govern.222 
The “effective control” test is a method for testing the legitimacy of a 
government, but this Comment argues that the test from Somalia is more 
complete, as it encompasses a more holistic view in asserting whether a 
government is legitimate. This test will demonstrate more strongly than the 
effective control test why the Ukrainian government is illegitimate. 
The factor of effective control is appropriately elaborated in Tinoco 
Arbitration223 and Northern Cyprus.224 In Tinoco Arbitration, the Tinoco 
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EMERY GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/24/2016 11:25 AM 
462 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
regime overthrew the previous government to come to power.225 Great Britain 
tried to enforce agreements entered into by the Tinoco regime, but Costa Rica 
denied the enforcement of the agreements because the Tinoco regime was not a 
de facto or de jure government.226 The Tinoco regime was rather peaceful and 
no other entity claimed to be the rightful government of the country.227 The 
case hinged on whether the government “established itself in such a way that 
all within its influence recognize[d] its control, and that there [was] no 
opposing force assuming to be a government in its place.”228 In Tinoco 
Arbitration, the arbitrators were concerned about whether the government had 
the acquiescence of the people it governed.229 The panel found that people 
accepted the government and that there was no other government claiming to 
be the actual legitimate government.230 Thus, a de facto government existed.231 
Furthermore, Northern Cyprus reiterates the notion that a de facto 
government must show control. The principles of this case maintain that 
territorial control of a government is a key factor in establishing whether the de 
facto government has enough effective control for it to become a 
government.232 The court stated, “[t]he Turkish forces, despite their best 
efforts, did not completely supplant the Republic nor its officers . . . [it] only 
acceded to the control of the northern portion of Cyprus.”233 This implies that 
in addition to acquiescence, courts can generally look to territorial control. 
Thus, in finding the existence of effective control the court should look to 
acquiescence of the State’s population, the lack of an opposing entity claiming 
to be the legitimate government, and territorial control over the entirety of the 
country, as opposed to just a portion of it. 
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2. Applying the Law of Legitimacy to Ukraine’s Government 
a. Ukraine’s Unconstitutional Ouster 
The first factor of the Somalia test asks whether the current Ukrainian 
government arrived to power out of the procedural manners set forth in 
Ukraine’s Constitution.234 Essentially, if the government did not come into 
power by operation of law, that being the Constitution, then it would fail to 
satisfy the first factor. Upon analyzing the facts in Ukraine, this Comment 
argues that there was no legal basis for the ouster of former President 
Yanukovych and the implementation of the new government. It was a 
revolutionary play that held no regard for Constitutional authority. 
Ukraine may have an issue as to which Constitution controls the country, 
however, both Constitutions are similar and require the same analysis in 
determining the legitimacy of the current government.235 In February 2014, 
President Yanukovych was supposed to reinstate the 2004 Constitution, 
pursuant to a peace deal with the European Union.236 The reinstatement would 
have weakened Presidential authority.237 However, President Yanukovych 
never reinstated the 2004 Consitution.238 Regardless of the applicability of 
either Constitution, both contain identical impeachment procedures in Article 
111 and grant the Verkhovna Rada the power to commence an impeachment 
proceeding in Article 85.239 Additionally, both Constitutions give the 
Verkhovna Rada the right to commence an impeachment procedure against the 
President “if he commits treason or other crime.”240 
Furthermore, both Constitutions require three-quarters of the 
“constitutional composition” of the Verkhovna Rada to vote in favor of 
impeachment to remove the President.241 Of 450 members, 328 voted to oust 
President Yanukovych.242 This did not meet the three-quarters requirement of 
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337 votes.243 On the textual basis of the Constitution, the ouster was not legal 
or in accordance within any Constitutional procedure. There was no legal basis 
for the ouster and it appears to be nothing more than a political rejection of 
Russian integration. 
The Verkhovna Rada may cite to Yanukovych’s abandoning the office of 
the Presidency as support for the legitimacy of the ouster, or they may even 
cite the deaths that occurred during the protests in the Maidan.244 However, 
these reasons do not support inculpation of treason or that he was guilty of 
some crime. It is difficult to show Yanukovych was the sole person responsible 
or even was a conspirator in the deaths of those at the Maidan and the evidence 
does not support him being guilty of a crime. 
Even still, if one were to accept these rather weak reasons, the fact remains 
that the votes needed to impeach Yanukovych were not obtained. Furthermore, 
an investigation and judgment from the Constitutional Court must occur before 
a Ukranian president can be impeached, and neither of these happened.245 The 
appointed interim government was not legitimate, and the current government 
that was established by the interim government is not legitimate. Since the 
current government is unconstitutional, it cannot be considered a government 
that is de jure or established by law. To be legitimized, it would have to show 
that it has effective control over the territory, as a de facto government 
would.246 
b. Ukraine’s Lack of Control 
The current Ukrainian government must show that it has administrative 
control over the territory if it hopes to be classified as legitimate. In applying 
the law of Tinoco Arbitration and Northern Cyprus to the facts in Ukraine, the 
current government cannot be said to have effective control. Thus, it does not 
meet the second factor of the Somalia test. The current government maintains 
effective control over the western half of the country, but not the eastern half. 
It has lost Crimea to Russia, the eastern territory is having referendums to 
 
 243 Deeks, supra note 241. 
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 246 See Republic of Somalia v. Woodhouse Drake & Carey, [1993] Q.B. 54, 67 (Eng.). The High Court 
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legitimate. Id.  
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secede, and the fighting and bloodshed has not stopped between the 
government and the dissenters in the eastern part of the country.247 
When assessing this factor with respect to Ukraine, the current government 
of Ukraine has little control over the eastern territory. In March 2014, Interim 
President Turchynov stated that the government had “practically lost control of 
the east of the country” and described his security forces as “helpless” when it 
comes to fighting the pro-Russian dissenters.248 Given the voting on secession 
referendums in eastern Ukraine, as well as the inability to control the pro-
Russian dissenters,249 the government has little control over a sizeable portion 
of the country. The eastern part of the country still believes that Yanukovych is 
the rightful President of Ukraine, views the ouster as unconstitutional, and 
rejects the current government.250 This claim has strong merit. 
The current government cannot be said to have taken power with support 
from a substantial number of the individuals in Ukraine. The eastern part of the 
country is still rebelling and calling for separation, all while claiming the 
illegitimacy of the current government.251 Furthermore, the western half of the 
country is not under the current government’s control, as the pro-Russian 
dissenters have control of at least 193 square miles of eastern Ukrainian 
territory.252 The eastern and western parts of Ukraine could not be more at 
odds with one another. The factor of effective control is not fulfilled, and the 
current government is not legitimate. 
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c. Ability to Deal with Other Governments 
In contrast, the current Ukrainian government has been regarded as 
legitimate by NATO and the United States.253 NATO has dealt with the current 
government as if it is the legitimate government of the country through 
supplying arms to extinguish the rebellion in the eastern half of the country.254 
Even if Ukraine were to show they are still entering into negotiations and 
relations with other governments, this is not a strong enough factor by itself to 
make the government legal and legitimate. 
d. The Extent of International Recognition of the Entity as the 
Government of the State in Question 
This factor need not be analyzed because the court in Somalia held, “where 
an unconstitutional entity exercised little or no effective control, no amount of 
recognition could entitle it to claim state property in an English court.”255 As 
has been established earlier in this Comment, the current Ukrainian 
government has little effective control over the country, and its power is not 
derived from the Constitution. 
E. NATO’s Intervention in Ukraine: A Violation of International Law? 
NATO members intervened in the conflict by supplying weapons to the 
Ukrainian government.256 Ukraine’s Defense Minister, Valery Heletey, said, “I 
have no right to disclose any specific country we reached that agreement with. 
But the fact is that those weapons are already on the way to us - that’s 
absolutely true, I can officially tell you.”257 Based on the statements from 
Ukraine’s Defense Minister, it is evident that some NATO countries have 
provided arms to fight against the dissenters in the eastern half of the 
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country.258 NATO has not deployed soldiers to the region, but its Secretary-
General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, has not precluded the possibility.259 
The United States has provided assistance to Ukraine, but has limited the 
assistance to supplying night vision goggles, body armor, and communications 
equipment.260 The United States is also planning to deploy military soldiers to 
Ukraine for training purposes.261 As of early February 2015, the United States 
had strongly considered sending arms to Ukraine.262 Additionally, the United 
States Congress passed the Ukraine Freedom Support Act, which authorized 
President Obama to use lethal and non-lethal aid to support Ukraine.263 NATO 
members and the United States have intervened with non-lethal aid, and 
seemed poised to act with lethal aid.264 If either NATO or the United States 
were to aid Ukraine with weapons and train its soldiers, then it would violate a 
fundamental principle of the ICJ’s decision in the Nicaragua case described 
below. Additionally, NATO would be acting outside the confines of Article 5 
of the NATO Charter, since Ukraine is not a NATO member. 
1. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
The facts of the Nicaragua case are as follows. The United States armed 
and trained rebels (known as the contras) in the hopes they would overthrow 
the existing Sandinista government.265 The contras would come from nearby 
nations and try to instigate rebellion in Nicaragua to destabilize the 
government.266 Nicaragua filed suit against the United States in the ICJ for 
arming and training the contras.267 Nicaragua alleged that the United States 
violated the general prohibition against the use of force as found in Article 2(4) 
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of the U.N. Charter and unlawfully intervened in the affairs of Nicaragua, 
prohibited by Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter.268 The United States 
counterclaimed that Nicaragua was arming groups in El Salvador and was 
engaged in “trans-border military incursions,”269 and asserted that arming the 
contras was collective self-defense.270 The Court found that the evidence of 
Nicaragua supplying arms to groups in El Salvador was rather weak.271 The 
Court looked to Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, which prescribes generally the 
sources of international law, to establish the governing law.272 
The Court put forth a number of basic legal propositions in rendering its 
decision, all of which will form a legal basis for addressing the current 
situation in Ukraine. The basic propositions are more pertinent to this 
Comment than the actual outcome in the Nicaragua case because they will 
provide the basis for the argument that NATO is violating the ICJ’s decision. 
First, the Court found that the parties to the case, Nicaragua and the United 
States, accepted that prohibitions on the “use of force” and the “exceptions to 
the use of force” in the U.N. Charter as a part of customary international 
law.273 Second, the Court stipulated that self-defense may only be justified by 
an armed attack, and arming and assisting rebels does not rise to the level of an 
armed attack.274 However, the Court did find that assisting and arming rebels 
could breach the “non-use of force” and non-interventionists principles found 
in Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the U.N. Charter, respectively.275 More 
specifically, the Court stated that the supply of arms or other “such activities” 
would be considered a use of force in violation of international law.276 
Thus, if State A commits an armed attack against State B, then State B 
would be permitted to use force against State A on the basis of self-defense. If 
State A uses force against State B, or intervenes in State B’s affairs, then State 
A would be in violation of international law. However, that does not 
 
 268 Michael Schmitt, Legitimacy Versus Legality Redux: Arming the Syrian Rebels, 7 J. NAT’L SECURITY 
L. & POL’Y 139, 141 (2014). 
 269 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
¶¶ 160, 164 (June 27).  
 270 Id. ¶ 165. 
 271 Id. ¶ 153 
 272 Id. ¶ 172; see Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, ¶ 1, Apr. 18, 1946, 59 Stat. 1055, 
T.S. No. 993. Article 38 of the ICJ Statute looks to treaties, customary international law, general principles of 
law, judicial decisions, and highly qualifies publicists in establishing the governing law. Id. 
 273 Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. ¶¶ 187–88.  
 274 Id. ¶ 195. 
 275 Id. ¶ 247. 
 276 See id. 
EMERY GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/24/2016 11:25 AM 
2016] ANALYZING THE REVOLUTION AND NATO ACTION 469 
necessarily permit State B to use force against State A in the name of self-
defense since it was not an armed attack. Additionally, the Court found that the 
principle of non-intervention found in Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter is 
customary international law and “forbids all states or groups of states to 
intervene directly or indirectly in internal or external affairs of other states.”277 
In this case, the Court ruled that the United States had no right to intervene 
because Nicaragua’s aid to the rebels in El Salvador did not rise to the level of 
an armed attack.278 Hence, the United States violated international law by 
aiding the rebels and supplying them with arms and training, which constituted 
a “use of force” and had unjustifiably intervened, for the purpose of toppling a 
legitimate government.279 The United States had no right to take any defensive 
measures since there was no evidence of an armed attack. The basic principles 
from this case will be helpful in elucidating and providing an analogy as to 
why NATO is violating Nicaragua in Ukraine. 
2. Applying the Nicaragua Analysis to Ukraine 
While the conflicts at issue in Nicaragua and Ukraine are dissimilar, the 
fundamental principles of the case can serve as a useful guide in evaluating the 
legality of NATO’s actions. Providing weapons (lethal or non-lethal) and 
training exercises to Ukraine’s illegitimate government for the purpose of 
suppressing protesters in eastern Ukraine violates basic principles of 
international law and the ICJ’s decision in Nicaragua. 
Much like in Nicaragua, a regional organization of governments (NATO), 
primarily led by the United States, is sending weapons to an illegitimate and 
illegal entity for the purpose of establishing and attaining its legitimacy. The 
current Ukrainian government unconstitutionally ousted a legitimate 
government on the basis that its political leanings were not in accordance with 
those residing in the western part of the country. It is an illegitimate body that 
is receiving military support from NATO members in the form of weapons, 
joint military exercises, and advice.280 This is much like the United States 
aiding the rebels in Nicaragua because both entities are illegitimate. 
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NATO is permitting and encouraging its members to supply this 
illegitimate government with weapons in order to seize the eastern part of the 
country.281 In Nicaragua, the United States was trying to tear down a 
legitimate government, but in Ukraine, the United States, along with other 
NATO members, is attempting to build and foment an illegitimate government 
by aiding it with weapons so it can secure its power and have “effective 
control” over the territory in eastern Ukraine. By arguing the inverse of 
Nicaragua, the ICJ could very well find that the same legal principles from 
Nicaragua could easily render NATO members in clear violation of the U.N. 
Charter. NATO members are violating Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter by 
using force (as defined in Nicaragua), and Article 2(7) by intervening in the 
internal affairs of Ukraine because Ukraine is not a NATO member. 
Although this government may not take the form of rebels, it stems from 
unlawful activity and is no more legitimate than a coup. Ukrainians in the 
eastern half of the country reject it and protest against the destructive behavior 
of those who established it. NATO’s duties do not legally encapsulate the 
building of an illegitimate government for the sake of political purposes and 
NATO should restrict its members from engaging in this situation. 
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Current reports have indicated that the United States is willing to offer 
lethal arms to support the Ukrainian government.282 Not only would this action 
patently violate international law and strengthen the gravity of the violation,283 
it would be a profound moral mistake. The aim of this Comment is to steer the 
current conflict away from violence and avoid the use of force. Benjamin 
Ferencz, the last remaining prosecutor from the Nuremberg trials, is a strong 
advocate of avoiding war and limiting the use of force. He has said, “[y]ou 
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cannot kill an ideology with a gun, you only create more enemies.”284 This is 
an insightful statement that provides a normative, moral guide in terms of how 
countries should view the use of force. NATO and the United States should 
avoid using force in Ukraine through the supplying of weapons. In diplomatic 
terms, supplying Ukraine with weapons to quell the protests in eastern Ukraine 
would only further foment hostile tensions between the West and Russia.  
In lieu of supplying weapons, NATO and the United States should foster a 
dialogue centered around either moral condemnation or diplomacy. Some 
concessions must be made for the sake of limiting violence and force. More 
specifically, the western half of Ukraine should consider the possibility of 
letting eastern Ukraine secede. 
International law is generally hostile to secession. It allows for it in only 
two situations: (1) the entire population of the country—not just inhabitants of 
the seceding region—votes in favor of secession by substantial majority; or (2) 
following an armed conflict, distinct territories of an existing state agree to part 
ways under a peace treaty and boundaries are redrawn under that treaty.285 
Either of these situations may give rise to secession in eastern Ukraine, but the 
first is preferred because it does not require an armed conflict. Ideally, the 
entire population of Ukraine would vote in favor of secession in eastern 
Ukraine,286 especially since the country is so divided politically, culturally, and 
linguistically.287 
The basis for secession could potentially be made on the right to self-
determination.288 Self-determination is the principle that “the rights of peoples 
and distinct nationalities to have a State that is representative of their national 
aspirations.”289 More specifically, external self-determination would permit 
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people to secede and form their own country.290 The government in the western 
part of the country is pro-West and the dissenters in the eastern part of the 
country are pro-Russian. Protests inspired the ouster of Ukraine’s rightful 
president and the establishment of an illegitimate government, which is now 
trying to suppress the reactions in the eastern half of the country. The current 
Ukrainian government is not advocating for or representing the interests of the 
people from the eastern part of the country, and this denial of the right to self-
determination could provide the basis for secession. However, it should be 
noted that self-determination does not necessarily include a right to unilateral 
secession and may have to include a vote of the citizens of western Ukraine.291 
As discussed above, a war of national liberation is generally seen as 
legitimate because it is closely connected to the right of self-determination.292 
Perhaps the United States, along with other NATO members, could 
collectively act to help the dissenters in eastern Ukraine, since there could be 
an argument for self-determination. While the focus of this Comment is not on 
the circumstances that would legally justify secession based on external self-
determination, secession is potentially one option for Ukraine to end this 
conflict. Violence and armed conflict will not produce any long-term winners 
in this situation, as they will only create more enemies at an international level 
and further alienate the Eastern and Western powers of the world. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the United States and NATO are violating international law 
by supplying weapons and aid to Ukraine. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter 
prohibits the use of force. It provides two exceptions to the use of force: self-
defense and a U.N. Security Council vote. NATO has not secured a valid U.N. 
Security Council vote to use force in Ukraine, and it cannot rely on self-
defense because no NATO members have been attacked. Article 5 of the 
NATO Treaty also provides no justification for collective self-defense. 
Therefore, NATO is violating the general prohibition against the use of force. 
Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter acts as an additional restraint on NATO 
because it expressly forbids states from intervening in the internal affairs of 
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other states. NATO is not complying with this Article.293 Nothing from the 
U.N. Charter or the NATO Treaty permits the intervention or flow of weapons 
into Ukraine. Also, NATO may not rely on Ukraine’s consent because the 
current Ukrainian government is illegitimate.294 The current Ukrainian 
government is illegitimate because it was established as the result of an ouster, 
has not been established by constitutional methods, and does not have effective 
control of the territory.295 NATO members are also violating the ICJ’s decision 
in Nicaragua by providing weapons to Ukraine’s illegitimate government. 
NATO members are trying to build up an illegitimate and illegal government 
so it can secure its power and have effective control over the country. 
NATO members, led by the United States, are violating international law 
and are at the forefront of a potential escalation of violence. The situation in 
Ukraine needs fewer guns, not more. International law exists for that very 
reason—regulating the relationships between states. One can only hope that 
NATO chooses the legal and higher moral ground in combating the ice-cold 
tensions of the past in order to help foster a dialogue based on the idea that the 
West and the East can have better relations. 
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